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In this paper, a comparative analysis between the main political citizen at-
titudes before the crisis in Iceland and Spain is carried out. After a brief review 
of political and economical antecendents, it was concluded that in Spain, as 
well as in Iceland, the key explanatory factors of the deep economic imbal-
ances are located at the institutional sphere. The excesses are related in both 
cases to political clientelism and to diverse corruptions practices, in such a 
way that even the alarming signs that preceded “the official date” of the eco-
nomic crisis, no convenient measures were adopted in time. In this context, the 
crisis has played a catalyst role, accelerating the demands aimed at achieving 
a better performance of the democratic system in both countries. Distrust in 
politicians and in political parties, as well as in other formal institutions, has 
not been translated neither in lack of confidence in the democracy system per 
se, nor in poltical apathy. Moreover, the discontent has been in both cases 
translated into both formulae of more political informal participation and of a 
greater support to more direct democracy, though through differents channels 
and with different results. In the discussion, diverse hypotheses are explored 
in order to explain the main findings in the comparative analysis. On the one 
hand, some of the variables associated to small-states literature are taken into 
account, in order to argue the main differences found out between the Spanish 
and Icelandic cases. On the other, diverse hypotheses from the political sci-
ence literature are considered in search of a plausible explanation of the major 
parallelisms found.
Keywords: Financial Crisis; Citizen Involvement; Political Dissatisfaction; Di-
rect Democracy; 15-M Movement; Small-States Literature; Institutions.
reSUmen
En este trabajo, se ha llevado a cabo un análisis comparativo de las prin-
cipales actitudes de los ciudadanos islandeses y españoles ante la crisis. Tras 
realizar una breve revisión de los antecedentes económicos y políticos, se 
concluye que, tanto en España como en Islandia, las claves explicativas de 
los profundos desequilibrios económicos se sitúan en la esfera institucional. 
Las causas de los excesos se relacionan en ambos casos con el clientelismo 
político y con diversas prácticas de corrupción, de forma que, a pesar de las 
señales de alarma que precedieron a “la fecha oficial” de la crisis financiera, 
no se adoptaron las medidas oportunas. En este contexto, la crisis económica 
ha desempeñado el papel de catalizador de reivindicaciones orientadas a con-
seguir un mejor funcionamiento del sistema democrático. La desconfianza en 
los políticos y en los partidos políticos, así como en otras instituciones for-
males, no se ha traducido en falta de confianza en el sistema democrático en 
sí, ni en apatía política. Más bien el descontento se ha traducido en ambos 
casos en fórmulas de mayor participación política informal y un mayor apoyo 
a fórmulas de democracia más directa, si bien por cauces diferentes y con dis-
tintos resultados. En la discusión, se exploran diversas hipótesis para explicar 
los resultados obtenidos en el estudio comparativo. Por una parte, con vistas 
a explicar las principales diferencias encontradas, se han tenido en cuenta al-
gunas de las variables consideradas en  la literatura específicamente referida a 
estados pequeños. Por otra, a efectos de argumentar del modo más plausible 
posible los principales paralelismos encontrados, se han sugerido algunas de 
las hipótesis manejadas en ciencia política. 
Palabras clave: Crisis financiera; Participación ciudadana; Desafección 
política; Democracia directa; Movimiento 15-M; Instituciones.
JEL classification: B52, F62, G01.
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introdUction*
There is a rather extended perception in different parts of the world a pro-
pos of the management of the economic and financial crisis in Iceland in the 
sense of considering that it has been courageously leaded from the most genu-
ine popular sovereignty. For instance, as for how the government in office was 
compelled to resign or how, facing the downfall of the major private banks, the 
citizenship successfully opposed to the payment of compensations to foreign 
depositors. It should also be mentioned the conviction that, in Iceland, all cor-
rupt people are sentenced in a flawless manner, and how, in close relation to 
the crisis and diverse popular demonstrations of discontent, a constitutional 
bill was drafted and unanimously approved by a directly elected assembly. 
However, the majority of these assertions require some nuances. 
In this paper, a comparison between the main political attitudes of citizens 
before the crisis in Iceland and Spain is carried out. A brief review of their po-
litical and economic background allows us to find some parallelisms: in both 
of them, worrying signals of economic imbalances existed years before “the 
official date” of the crisis, and in none of them the adequate measures were 
taken out in time. Besides, political and institutional factors could have more 
explanatory power to interpret the recent evolution of their economies than 
the international financial crisis itself. 
In the next section, I analyze the basics of both the political system and the 
economic crisis in Iceland and Spain. Next, political culture is outlined, empha-
sizing how, in both cases, it constitutes a key explanatory factor of their own 
internal crisis. I dedicate also a section to show how the economic crisis has 
played the role of a catalyst of claims in order to achieve a better performance 
of the democratic system in both countries. The distrust in politicians and po-
litical parties, as well as in other institutions, gave rise to more citizen involve-
ment and support for direct democracy, even though in different ways and 
with different outcomes. The paper concludes with a discussion. In particular, 
diverse hypotheses are explored in order to explain the main findings derived 
from the comparative analysis carried out. On the one hand, in order to argue 
the main differences found between the Spanish and Icelandic cases, some of 
* I am very grateful for the suggestions and comments made to a preliminary version of this paper 
at the XVII World Economy Meeting, particularly to Prof. Valpy FitzGerald. I am also grateful to Javier 
Echevarría Navarro for his helpful comments and language assistance on earlier drafts of this paper. 
Any potential errors are solely the responsibility of the author.
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the variables associated to small-states literature are considered. On the other, 
in search of a plausible explanation of the major parallelisms found between 
them, diverse hypotheses from the political science literature are taken into 
account. 
   
1. political and economic backGroUnd
Iceland is an ancient and consolidated parliamentary democracy. Although 
the electoral system was reformed in 1959, over-representation of rural ar-
eas still persists. Since the 20th century, the country had almost always been 
governed by majority party coalitions. Protest initiatives prompted the gov-
ernment to convoke elections in April 2009. This was the first time that a left 
coalition took office as well as the first time in its 80-year-old history that the 
Independence Party did not obtain the largest share of the vote (Jóhannesson 
2013). On his turn, since 1978 Spain is a parliamentary monarchy. A pro-
portional-representation electoral system was established, with a majoritarian 
bias. In order to facilitate the existence of big and strong political parties and 
consolidate the new democracy, closed and blocked lists were established. The 
Spanish political system was in fact articulated as a two-party system, the so-
called “bipartisanship”. Some new parties were created recently in Spain and 
these minor parties seem to be able to break the “bipartisanship”. 
Prior to the economic and financial crisis, the Spanish economy was too 
focused on activities with low productivity levels, in particular in the construc-
tion sector. It was also too dependent on external credit. The rising deficits in 
the current account balance were linked to the high private level of indebted-
ness tied to the real estate sector. Even if sporadic public superavits had been 
attained the two fiscal years previous to the crisis, these did not compensate 
for increases of the private indebtedness. Thus, the fall in interest rates and the 
expansion of credit, together with a rigid supply, contributed to the housing 
bubble which took place in parallel to the economic and financial crisis in Spain 
(see, for instance, Hernández and Jimeno 2013). 
Deficit and debt levels experienced a deep increasement and credit was real-
located from the private to the public sector (see, for instance, Broner et al. 2014). 
The austerity that characterized the majority of policies taken, along with an “in-
ternal devaluation”, contribute to explain why external imbalances ceased to be a 
problem. The total public aids provided to the banking sector from the beginning 
of the crisis amounted 61 billions of euros. Nevertheless, the public participation 
in the banking system has not completely disappeared yet (Bank of Spain 2014).
Easy access to credit in the international financial markets also led to the 
expansion of the banking sector in Iceland, in particular of the recently privat-
ized banks, after a process of liberalization of the economy that took place 
between the 1990s and 2004. In 1994 Iceland became a member of the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (EEA) and, among other consequences, restrictions on 
movement of capital were removed. In 2001 a floating exchange rate regime 
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was established, anchored by an inflation target (Matthiasson 2008). Persis-
tent inflationary pressures led the Central Bank of Iceland to increase the in-
terest rate. The collateralised lending rate reached two digits in January 2006 
(18% in October 2008). According to Wade (2009), while failing to contain in-
flation, this measure encouraged borrowing abroad in lower-interest-rate cur-
rencies and, at the same time, attracted huge amounts of speculative capitals, 
seduced by the interest rate differential and the appreciation of the Icelandic 
Krona (IK). The economic growth became dependent on foreign capitals and 
when the liquidity crisis in the interbank market started, the banks resorted to 
the retail money market, attracting deposits abroad, such as Icesave Internet 
accounts, through relatively high interest rates (Wade 2009). Given the interest 
rate differential, the magic formula seemed to be: “to borrow outside-to lend 
inside”, while the consequences of the excessive risks taken started to relapse 
into the whole economy.  Similar to Spain, all this, combined with a rigid sup-
ply, resulted in a housing price bubble (Matthiasson 2008). 
As is well known, in 2008, the three major banks of Iceland collapsed and 
were re-nationalized. In contrast to other deposits that were operated through 
subsidiaries, Icesave online deposit accounts in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands were not covered by national deposit protection schemes, as they 
operated through branches of Landsbanki (one of the three major collapsed 
banks), supervised by  the bank´s home country.
The external sector markledly contributed to the recovery of both the Icelan-
dic and the Spanish economies. This process took place in direct relation to the 
depretiation of the IK in the first case, and with support on an “internal devalu-
ation” process in the second one. As in the Spanish economy, the Icelandic one 
suffered deep deficits in its current account balance the years prior to the crisis 
(up to 25% of GDP in 2006), turning to superavit in 2013 (from 2009 if expenses 
in winding-up proceedings are excluded) (see Bank of Spain 2014, Central Bank 
of Iceland-Statistics, and OECD 2013). In the same way, public debt grew, from 
relatively modest values the previous years to the crisis in both countries, to lev-
els between 80-90% of GDP. While this figure started to fall below 80% of GDP 
in the first months of 2014 in Iceland, it is approaching 100% of GDP nowadays 
in Spain (Bank of Spain data and Central Bank of Iceland 2014). Nevertheless, 
as loans had been indexed against inflation or foreign-currency denominated, 
the private debt (in the hands of both households and firms) also increased. 
Some of these loans had been ruled illegal by the Supreme Cour. Besides, some 
support measures have been put on the table, such as “the 110% measure”; a 
ceiling fixed at 110% of the value of mortgaged assets. All in all, household debt 
remains relatively high and uncertainty persists. Despite the signals of economic 
recovery, first in Iceland and afterwards in Spain, difficulties in obtaining credit 
are reported by firms in both countries.  
In sum, many similarities may be found between Iceland and Spain in terms 
of the main economic imbalances that preceded the international crisis. In par-
ticular, the dependence on external capitals (in close relation to the real estate 
sector), and the inflationary pressures. 
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2. the political cUltUre and the “extractive eliteS”
Both, Spain and Iceland, had their own internal crisis, favoured to a great ex-
tent by their own political culture and public institutions. That is, their problems 
are as much political as economic (Gylfason 2014a; Fernández-Villaverde et al. 
2013). The economic imbalances were linked in Spain to the real estate boom and 
the corruption generated around it, and in Iceland to the expansion of the banking 
sector and the corrupt manner of its Russian-style privatization (Gylfason 2014a).
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) indicate that, given that Spaniards have 
traditionally held a large share of their wealth in real estate, the drop in inter-
est rates had a distinctive effect in their economy, aggravated by the network 
of vested interests woven around the sector. The institutional issues analyzed 
by these authors refers to the fact that since 1997 regions have nearly com-
plete control over zoning, and that land development became a significant 
(both legal and illegal) source of revenues for local authorities giving rise to a 
widespread corruption. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) point also out the 
capture of the cajas (a type of savings banks; the nonprofit segment versus the 
banks) by local politicians and how they channeled lending in an indiscriminate 
way to real estate developers. Thus, they resorted to wholesale funding on an 
unprecedented scale, exacerbating the effects of the financial crisis. At pre-
sent, almost all cajas have disappear as such and in parallell the autonomous 
regions started suffering an institutional crisis. 
As Molinas (2013) points out, the Spanish entrepreneurs, in collusion with 
the policitians, have developed a system of rent-seeking, or, extractive economic 
institutions. These are defined by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) as those de-
signed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a dif-
ferent subset, without adding new wealth, that is, detering economic prosperity. 
Politicians have become an extractive elite that places its own interest first. The 
aforementioned author estimates that there are around 300,000 people whose 
appointment, rents or privileges depend in some way on political decisions. This 
is particularly remarkable around the enterprises and diverse types of entities 
created under the tutelage of the cajas by the regional governments. Besides, 
a number of regulatory and supervisory institutions (theoretically independent) 
became colonized by the two biggest parties (the People´s Party and the Span-
ish Socialist Workers’ Party), sharing between them quotas in order to appoint 
positions in their governing bodies (Molinas 2013). A good example of the prob-
lematic links, from an ethical point of view, between political and entrepreneurial 
structures is the fact that two ex presidents of the Spanish national government 
(thus, belonging to the two biggest parties) were in the board of directors of two 
of the biggest enterprises in the energy sector, one of the most regulated in the 
Spanish economy, structured as an oligopoly. 
Though in another way, the banks in Iceland were also captured by the 
politicians. State banks in Iceland were part of the political power structure 
and, once privatized, the interests network persisted, with alliances and ties 
between politicians and banks, questionable from an ethical point of view [such 
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as political contributions and substantial loans to various MPs (members of 
parliament)] (Gylfason 2013a and 2014a, and Wade 2009). 
Several years before 2008 observers, technical staff and policymakers had 
started to warn of the presence of serious imbalances in the Spanish economy. 
Nevertheless, no credible measures were undertaken in the matter (Fernández-
Villaverde et al. 2013). On his turn, in Iceland, as early as in 2004, a consulta-
tion group was set up by the Icelandic authorities in order to collaborate with 
politicians in preventing a financial crisis. All in all, the group was not formally 
established until two years latter and symptoms of bad working practice were 
found (Árnason 2010). Moreover, some foreign observers had mentioned the 
excessive growth of the Icelandic banking system and its risks, among other 
imbalances (Jóhannesson 2013 and Wade 2009).
In order to understand the cause of the banking crisis and analyze if the 
government could have prevented it, a Special Investigative Commission (SIC) 
was established in Iceland. The SIC concluded that even if governmental meas-
ures would have taken place in 2006 it would have been too late to save the 
banks. Furthermore, bankers were not the sole agents to be criticized; govern-
mental administrative apparatus and its political leadership were also object 
of criticism, basically in terms of laxity and lack of transparency (Óskarsdóttir 
2012). On his turn, the Working Group on Ethics (WGE), as part of the SIC, 
carried out an inquiry to estimate to what extent the banks´ collapse could be 
explained by morality and work practices in three spheres: the financial sector, 
the administrative-political sector, and the socio-cultural sphere (including the 
media). Indeed, the main conclusion was that although several individuals, in 
different spheres “... showed negligence and sometimes reprehensible action, 
the most important lessons to draw from these events are about weak social 
structures, political culture and public institutions” (Althingi 2010a). 
In sum, easy access to credit in the international financial markets led in both 
countries to the expansion of the banking sector. In particular, the expansion of the 
recently privatized banks in Iceland (domestically and internationally expanded) 
and of the cajas (above all) in Spain (domestically). The cause of the excesses, 
instead, should be searched for in the institutional sphere, frequently in close re-
lation to clientelist and collusion practices. Thus, political clientelism and diverse 
forms of corruption explain in great extent the deep roots of their internal crisis. 
In parallel to the economic and financial crisis, an institutional and political 
crisis emerged in the Spanish society. Diverse circumstances contributed to 
it. For instance, the delay on part of the government in recognizing the true 
importance and character of the crisis increased the lack of trust in politicians. 
Similar circumstances surrounded the Icelandic crash. Besides, in general, the 
Spanish population perceives unfair asymmetries between the rescue meas-
ures of the banking system (involving high public expenditures linked to its re-
structuring) and the eviction processes suffered by many households that have 
been unable to deal with the mortgages granted by these very same financial 
entities. In Iceland, during the 2009-early 2013 period, three families per day 
in average were object of eviction´s processes, while banks “... continue in some 
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ways to behave like a state within the state despite having been found guilty in 
court of legal violations” (Gylfason 2014a). 
At the same time, the end of the so-called “culture of the transition” seems to 
be taking place in Spain, contributing likewise to favour the political aspirations 
of many Spaniards in terms of new rules governing the political arena. The “cul-
ture of the transition” refers to a cultural model created in the period of the incip-
ient transition to democracy, oriented to eliminate any destabilizing, dissenting 
or problematic initiative (Martínez 2011). This model was displayed as the only 
way to a peaceful system of coexistence, given the diverse fears deeply rooted 
in the Spanish society (such as the possibility of a coup d´état; terrorist activities 
or the ungovernability of the country). It constituted a sort of cultural monopoly 
in the hands not only of the state but also the media, that created a conformist 
imaginary with implications over public issues in general. Among the changes in 
the political system that increasingly Spaniards aim to achieve, two must be em-
phasized: internal democracy in the political parties and a new electoral system 
(for instance, open lists for congress elections -not only for the senate´s-, and an 
allocation of seats more proportional to the number of votes actually obtained). 
Thus, according to Metroscopia´s surveys, in May 2014, 93% of the interviewed 
declared that the political parties should introduce deep changes in order to pay 
more attention to what people think, against 90% declared two years before.
In this vein, Molinas (2013) considers that the political regime derived from 
the 1978 constitution is suffering remarkable legitimacy losses, pointing out 
that what is unusual in the Spanish case is not the existence of political cor-
ruption, but the absence of mechanisms to control it. Indeed, popular pressure 
has been exerted in Spain in order to regulate a new law of political parties. 
For instance, various platforms focused on signing petitions in this sense have 
been launched simultaneously in the Internet, giving rise to duplicities between 
some of them. Several parties have already initiated motu proprio changes in 
this direction, in particular, to attain more direct intra-party democracy. This 
has been the case, to a great extent, in some of the most recently founded, 
with the exception of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party that, after almost 
twenty years holding non-direct primaries, has held for the first time secret, di-
rect and open to all affiliated members ballot on July 13, 2014 (“one affiliated 
member, one vote”), in order to elect their general secretary. 
3. and yet it moves: citizenS political attitUdeS dealinG with the criSiS 
Political and institutional roots should be scrutinized both in Iceland and 
Spain, in order to understand the actual sense of the economic crisis. To this 
effect, it is very illustrative to observe the evolution in parallel of the (negative) 
assessment that the Spanish population carries out of the current economic 
and political situation (see figure 1). Similarly, in Iceland, “... a narrative gained 
ground, which held that the crisis was the result of a tradition of clientelistic 
political parties...” (Óskarsdóttir 2012). 
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fiGUre 1. evolUtion of the aSSeSSment of the cUrrent economic and political SitUation in Spain, 
2004-2015
Source: Ellaborated with Data from CIS (Consejo de Investigaciones Sociológicas).
Both countries share severe consequences of the crisis on their economies, 
as well as a distrust climate and low levels of confidence in political institutions 
(see tables 1 and 2). According to the Standard Eurobarometer, from 2009 on-
wards, the  distrust level in diverse governmental institutions in Spain is higher 
than both in the EU on average, and in Iceland (table 1). It is worthy to point 
out how political parties are the less trusted among the institutions included 
in table 1, in all cases (EU, Iceland and Spain). A similar picture is provided by 
the World Economic Forum estimates: from 2013 onwards, except for irregular 
payments and bribes, the appraisal corresponding to Spain yields values under 
the world average, and below those corresponding to Iceland for all the items 
shown in table 2. In both countries, the values obtained in 2015 remain below 
those attained in 2008 (except for transparency of government policymaking 
in the Spanish case) (see table 2). 
 
 
8 
democracy. This has been the case, to a great extent, in some of the most recently 
founded, with the exception of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party that, after almost 
twenty years holding non-direct primaries, has held for the first time secret, direct and 
open to all affiliated members ballot on July 13, 2014 (“one affiliated member, one vote”), 
in order to elect their general secretary.  
 
3. AND YET IT MOVES: CITIZENS POLITICAL ATTITUDES DEALING WITH THE 
CRISIS  
Political and institutional roots should be scrutinized both in Iceland and Spain, in order 
to understand the actual sense of the economic crisis. To this effect, it is very illustrative 
to observe the evolution in parallel of the (negative) assessment that the Spanish 
population carries out of the current economic and political situation (see figure 1). 
Similarly, in Iceland, “... a narrative gained ground, which held that the crisis was the 
result of a tradition of clientelistic political parties...” (Óskarsdóttir 2012).  
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the assessment of the current economic and political 
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table 1. trUSt in national inStitUtionS: tend not to trUSt it, % (eU, iceland and Spain), 2007-2015
EU27 (EU28 
from 2013 
onwards)
Iceland Spain
2007
(Fieldwork: September-
November)
Political parties 75% - 61%
The Government 59% - 45%
The Parliament 56% - 43%
Justice/the legal system 46% - 38%
2008 
(Fieldwork: October-
November) 
Political parties 75% - 64%
The Government 61% - 49%
The Parliament 58% - 47%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
44% - 44%
Justice/the legal system 47% - 42%
2009
(Fieldwork: October-
November)
Political parties 79% - 80%
The Government 65% - 68%
The Parliament 63% - 66%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
43% - 56%
Justice/the legal system 51% - 55%
2010
(Fieldwork: November; 
May for the data corres-
ponding to regional or 
local public authorities)
Political parties 80% 84% 85%
The Government 67% 69% 74%
The Parliament 62% 68% 69%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
46% 41% 57%
Justice/the legal system 48% 35% 51%
2011
(Fieldwork: November)
Political parties 81% 83% 84%
The Government 70% 70% 80%
The Parliament 66% 69% 74%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
48% 43% 61%
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2012
(Fieldwork: November)
Political parties 80% 81% 91%
The Government 68% 65% 86%
The Parliament 66% 64% 85%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
50% 33% 74%
2013
(Fieldwork: November)
Political parties 82% 76% 93%
The Government 72% 67% 89%
The Parliament 69% 57% 89%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
50% 32% 75%
2014
(Fieldwork: November)
Political parties 80% 76% 92%
The Government 65% 64% 87%
The Parliament 62% 55% 84%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
50% 35% 78%
Justice/the legal system 45% 31% 71%
2015
(Fieldwork: November)
Political parties 78% - 86%
The Government 66% - 80%
The Parliament 64% - 80%
Regional or local public 
authorities 
51% - 72%
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, European Commission (several years: EB68, EB70, EB72, EB73, 
EB74, EB76, EB78, EB80, EB82, and EB84).
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table 2. opinion SUrvey indicatorS-inStitUtionS, 2007-08, 2013, 2014, and 2015 (iceland, 
Spain and the world averaGe*) on a Scale of 1 to 7 (from the worSt to the beSt poSSible 
oUtcome) 
Iceland (rank) Spain (rank)
World (weighted 
average)
Transparency of government 
policymaking
2007-08 5.6 (6) 3.8 (89) 4.2
2013 4.9 (26) 3.9 (87) 4.2
2014 4.7 (23) 3.6 (105) 4.0
2015 5.1 (20) 4.0 (76) 4.2
Favoritism in decisions of 
government officials
2007-08 5.2 (9) 3.5 (43) 3.3
2013 3.6 (40) 3.1 (64) 3.2
2014 3.7 (35) 3.0 (78) 3.2
2015 3.9 (31) 2.9 (78) 3.2
Diversion of public funds due 
to corruption
2007-08 6.1 (7) 4.7 (32)  3.8
2013 5.1 (22) 3.2 (69) 3.5
2014 5.1 (22) 2.8 (90) 3.5
2015 5.3 (20) 2.9 (98) 3.6
Irregular payments and 
bribes
2007-08 - - -
2013 6.3 (7) 4.7 (43) 4.1
2014 6.3 (8) 4.4 (50) 4.1
2015 6.5 (5) 4.5 (45) 4.1
Public trust in politicians
2007-08 5.7 (7)  3.6 (39) 3.0
2013 3.3 (48) 2.3 (101) 3.1
2014 4.0 (27) 2.2 (117) 3.1
2015 4.3 (26) 2.3 (108) 3.2
Judicial independence
2007-08 5.9 (14)  4.3 (56) 4.1
2013 5.6 (19) 3.7 (72) 3.9
2014 5.5 (23) 3.2 (97) 3.9
2015 5.7 (19) 3.5 (84) 4.0
* 134, 148, 144, and 140 economies included, respectively.
Source: Schwab K. (ed.) (2013): The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014. Geneva: World 
Economic Forum; Schwab K. (ed.) (2014): The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015. Geneva: 
World Economic Forum; Schwab K. (ed.) (2015): The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016. 
Geneva: World Economic Forum; and Schwab K., and Porter M.E. (co-dirs.) (2008): The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2008-2009. Geneva: World Economic Forum. 
Corruption explains to a great extent a rise of distrust in public institutions, 
both in Iceland and Spain. Nevertheless, a gap does exist between different es-
timates. In particular, in Spain corruption perception points at alarming levels, 
while other estimates, possibly more objetive, such as those referred to direct 
experiences with bribes, provide a different picture. Basically, politicians, rather 
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than civil servants, mainly at regional and municipal level, are involved in the 
high-profile corruption scandals. The length of proceedings (10 years on average 
for corruption macrocases) and the high level of reprieves in relation to this kind 
of offences (132 reprieves given to politicians condemned because of corruption 
between 2000 and 2012) most certainly lead to a impunity perception, as well 
as a tendency to magnify the problem (Fundación Alternativas 2014).
As can be seen in table 3, the dissatisfaction degree with how democra-
cy works nationally has increased. It should be highlighted how, in just seven 
years, appraisal in Spain is completely reversed: in 2007 more than three-
quarters of the population was completely satisfied with democracy, while in 
2014 less than a quarter was. Nevertheless, the last data available show us 
that dissatisfaction with the way national democracy works has lost significant 
ground in Spain (see table 3). All in all, in the EU on average, the fall of the 
satisfaction degree has been much more moderate, amounting 5 points from 
the beginning of the studied period versus 42 points in Spain. The gathered 
data in table 3 allow us to assert that, from 2010 onwards, the percentage of 
polled people dissatisfied is greater in Spain than in the EU. In the same vein, 
experts in Spain estimate that democracy quality is decreasing. According to 
the reports of the Fundación Alternativas, on a scale of 0 to 10, the rating fell 
from 6.2 points in 2007 to 5.2 points in 2014 (obtained by polling a group of 
experts -57 questions-, and applying the methodology developed at the Hu-
man Rights Centre at Essex University).
table 3. perception of the way national democracy workS: deGree of SatiSfaction, % (eU, iceland 
and Spain), 2007-2015*
EU27 (EU28 
from 2013 
onwards)
Iceland Spain
2007
(Fieldwork: September-
November)
Total “Satisfied`” 58%
-
77%
Total “Not satisfied” 39%
-
20%
Don´t know 3%
-
3%
2009
(Fieldwork: October-
November)
Total “Satisfied`” 53%
-
58%
Total “Not satisfied” 45%
-
41%
Don´t know 2%
-
1%
2010
(Fieldwork: May)
Total “Satisfied`” 54% 49% 53%
Total “Not satisfied” 44% 49% 45%
Don´t know 2% 2% 2%
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2011
(Fieldwork: November)
Total “Satisfied`” 52%
-
45%
Total “Not satisfied” 46%
-
53%
Don´t know 2%
-
2%
2012
(Fieldwork: November)
Total “Satisfied`” 49%
-
32%
Total “Not satisfied” 49%
-
66%
Don´t know 2%
-
2%
2013
(Fieldwork: November)
Total “Satisfied`” 46%
-
24%
Total “Not satisfied” 52%
-
75%
Don´t know 2%
-
1%
2014
(Fieldwork: November) Total “Satisfied`” 50%
-
22%
Total “Not satisfied” 48%
-
76%
Don´t know 2%
-
2%
2015
(Fieldwork: May)
Total “Satisfied`” 53%
-
35%
Total “Not satisfied” 45%
-
63%
Don´t know 2%
-
2%
* This question was not asked in the 2008 surveys (see Eurobarometers EB 69 and EB 70). For a 
global (EU) perspective from 2004 to date, please see the figure on page 100 of EB 80 (Standard 
Eurobarometer 80, Public Opinion in the EU, Autumn 2013).
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, European Commission (several years: EB68, EB72, EB73, EB76, 
EB78, EB80, EB82, and EB83).
All information displayed above shows the growth of political and institu-
tional disaffection both in Spain and in Iceland. Table 4 concerns interest in 
politics in the period 2008-2015. The gathered data for Spain show a moder-
ate upward trend. Politicians in general, political parties and politics had be-
come a problem themselves in the last years in Spain. The fact that this prob-
lem has been gaining significance among the most important ones mentioned 
in the public-opinion polls in Spain, expresses a severe problem of political 
dissatisfaction (see table 5). 
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table 4. intereSt in national and local politicS: total “yeS”, %a, 2008-2015
EU27 (EU28 
in 2014 and 
2015)
Iceland Spain
2008 
(Fieldwork: October-
November) 
Political matters 71% - 59%
2010
(Fieldwork: November)
National political matters 74% 89% 58%
Local political matters 74% 88% 61%
2011
(Fieldwork: November)
National political matters 73% 87% 66%
Local political matters 74% 85% 71%
2012
(Fieldwork: May)b
National political matters 76% 84% 67%
Local political matters 73% 80% 69%
2013
(Fieldwork: May)
National political matters 75% - 66%
Local political matters 73% - 63%
2014
(Fieldwork: June) National political matters 76% 85% 70%
Local political matters 74% 89% 67%
2014 
(Fieldwork: November) 
National Political matters 77% 84% 65%
2015
(Fieldwork: May)
National political matters 77% - 67%
Local political matters 74% - 65%
a In respect to the question: “When you get together with friends or relatives, 
would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?”, 
% of polled people whose answer was “Frequently or occasionally”.
b In EB78 (Fieldwork: November 2012), these two data are not available for 
Iceland, thus, we have used data from EB77 (Fieldwork: May 2012).
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, European Commission (several years: EB70, 
EB74, EB76, EB77, EB79, EB81, EB82, and EB83).
220 Laura Cabiedes Miragaya
table 5. the three moSt important problemS Spain iS facinG at the moment (mUltiple anSwerS 
poSSible, max. 3 anSwerS) pUblic-opinion poll, %, 2004-2015
2004 
(May)
2005 
(May)
2006 
(May)
2007 
(May)
2008 
(May)
2009 
(May)
2010 
(May)
2011 
(May)
2012 
(May)
2013 
(May)
2014 
(May)
2015 
(May)
Unemployment 59.0 53.1 46.3 42.2 52.5 77.3 79.9 84.1 81.7 82.4 80.8 79.4
Corruption and 
deception
0.7 0.4 1.6 2.8 0.5 1.9 4.4 5.0 9.3 30.7 35.7 50.8
Problems of eco-
nomic character
11.9 17.3 17.3 15.5 51.9 48.7 50.9 46.6 51.0 34.9 28.6 25.1
Politicians in 
general, political 
parties and 
politics 
4.8 7.8 8.2 11.1 7.1 10.1 18.8 22.1 22.5 29.7 25.6 18.8
Source: CIS (Consejo de Investigaciones Sociológicas).
The lack of confidence in representative democracy was not translated into 
a loss of confidence in the democratic system per se in Spain. Rather, formulae 
of more citizen involvement and more direct democracy were claimed for and/or 
tried in the last years. As in Spain, in Iceland, as trust in representative democ-
racy fell, support for more citizen involvement and more direct democracy grew 
(Óskarsdóttir 2012). Besides, there are no signs that political apathy is rising in 
neither of this two countries. On the contrary, the rejection to the poltical statu 
quo or, more generally, to the way representative democracy functions nowadays, 
has given rise to numerous open demonstrations and public rallies, as well as di-
verse and numerous citizens initiatives and social movements: citizens´ campaigns, 
new parties and new associations [such as the (Icelandic) Association of indebted 
households and the (Spanish) Platform for those Affected by Mortgages (PAM); or 
the Constitutional Society in Iceland]. Many of these initiatives were spread with 
the support of digital communication networks, such as Internet forums, social 
networks and platforms. In sum, it seems that the economic crisis played the role 
of a catalyst of claims in order to achieve a better performance of the democratic 
system, through non-electoral political participation, especially, protest initiatives. 
Table 6 illustrates the absence of political apathy signs in Spain. Despite 
the inconveniences with respect to this kind of data, both data series displayed 
in table 6 show that the number of demonstrations has increased visibly, in 
parallel with the economic crisis, as was the case with other initiatives of non-
electoral political participation. In particular, the attitudes and reactions of 
citizens are increasingly oriented towards three kinds of protest initiatives in 
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Spain: signing petitions (more than 33% of the interviewed declared having 
followed this initiative in the last 12 months), legal demonstrations (close to 
26%), and participation in social organizations (more than 20%) (European 
Social Survey 2002-2012, from Fundación Alternativas, 2014).
table 6.  annUal nUmber of demonStrationS in Spain Since 2006
Year Informed (A) Uninformed (A) Prohibited (A) Total (A) Total (B)
2006 4,066 5,165 2 9,231 12,765
2007 4,527 4,604 12 9,131 14,184
2008 8,760 6,466 139 15,226 16,118
2009 18,568 5,455 297 24,023 17,453
2010 21,941 ND 273 > 21,941 19,336
2011 21,297 ND 371 > 21,297 18,422
2012 44,233 ND 294 > 44,233 44,815
2013 43,170 ND 1,682 > 43,170 49.302
2014 36,679 ND 1,482       > 36,679 45,161
Sources: (A): Ellaborated with data from Ministerio del Interior (Anuario Estadístico, various years) 
and (B): Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (Informe de Evaluación sobre el 
Funcionamiento de los Servicios de la Administración Periférica del Estado,  various years. Data from 
Basque Country and Catalonia are not included).
3.1. the 15-m movement
It is almost impossible to carry out a systematic revision of all the social 
movements (sometimes disperse) and of the  mobilization initiatives (non-al-
ways clearly delimited) in Spain. For this reason, the 15-M (or indignados) 
movement, a well-known internationally initiative, is to be highlighted. The 
15-M movement is the stronger citizens movement in the present democratic 
period in Spain. It has achieved to redefine politics (see Beas, 2011), and even 
to spread itself overseas. This popular movement of protests (without prec-
edents) took place on May 15, 2011, just one week before regional and mu-
nicipal elections. The revulsives came from different online and grassroots plat-
forms, such as No Les Votes (“Do Not Vote for Them”), an online campaign rec-
ommending not voting the major parties, in opposition to the “Ley Sinde”, a bill 
aimed at curtailing “Internet piracy” (Postill 2014). Other antecedents linked 
to the 15-M movement were the platforms “Youth without a Future” (centered 
around the youth unemployment in Spain) and the PAM (housing issues). It is 
worthy to remark how “freedom technologists” linked to the 15-M movement 
(through No Les Votes platform) redirected their activities from the free culture 
to meta-politics issues, focusing finally on changing the political system as a 
whole (see Fuster 2012 and Postill 2014). A few months before the 15-M 
march, diverse collectives diffused the protest call through social networks and 
forums. The initiative was bonded through online platform “Real Democracy 
now!” (“¡Democracia Real Ya!”). The demonstrations call was a success: around 
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50 cities mobilized approximately 150,000 people (20,000 in Madrid) (see 
http://www.tomalaplaza.net, the main national portal of the 15-M movement, 
and http://www.15m.cc/p/que-es-15mcc.html, the “15Mpedia”, an independ-
ent umbrella covering issues and projects about the 15-M movement).
At first leaded by young people, the movement as such started on 15 May, 
2011, in Madrid. A spontaneous sit-down after the arrest of around twenty partici-
pants at the end of the march, ended as a permanent encampment (acampada). It 
was followed by other pacific encampments in different places in Spain in the subse-
quent days. A clear example of citizens involvement in diverse initiatives surrounding 
the 15-M movement is the multiple assemblies ruled by open and spontaneous 
participation. Some neighbourhood assemblies ended up becoming cooperatives. 
According to the enquiry carried out by Calvo et al. (2011) about the profile of 
the participants in the 15-M movement, it is to be pointed out their low age (the 
majority comprised between 19 and 30 years old), high educative level (predomi-
nantly licenciate or university students) and well defined political conscience, even 
though they usually do not vote and when they do, they vote minor parties. Their 
aim consists of a general reform of the way politics works, in order to attain a more 
participative democracy, escaping from the bipartisanship model.
From the start, the 15-M movement avoided formal links with political parties 
or trade unions. Nevertheless, according to the enquiry carried out by Calvo et al. 
(2011) the participants are less reticent to declare their ideology than the Spaniards 
on average, declaring a clear trend to the left. On the other hand, it is unavoidable to 
relate the creation of some new parties with the 15-M movement. In particular, the 
We Can party (Podemos) turned out to be identified with the movement. 
The 15-M movement generated a high level of sympathy among the Spanish 
population, even three years after the first mobilizations. According to the surveys 
carried out by Metroscopia, the 15-M movement inspires sympathy rather than 
rejection to more than 50% of the population (66% if referred to early June 2011, 
and 56% in May 2014). Besides, not more than 33% of the population declared a 
rejection (the rest shows neither sympathy, nor rejection) (Ferrándiz 2014). 
3.2 “the potS and panS revolUtion” in iceland: paralleliSmS and differenceS 
with reSpect to the 15-m movement
“The pots and pans revolution” constitutes an illustrative example of support 
for more citizen involvement and more direct democracy in Iceland in the last 
years: “Under the sponsorship of the newly formed Voices of the People, some 
2,000 to 10,000 people –many of them middle-aged and middle-class, not stere-
otypical protesters– have gathered in Reykjavik's small central square every Satur-
day afternoon since October [2008] to articulate popular demands on the govern-
ment ... [and] Every Monday evening, up to a thousand have attended meetings in 
Reykjavik's biggest theater ... “ (Wade 2009).
Some parallelisms may be found between “the pots and pans revolution” and 
the 15-M movement. In both cases, the citizens claim for more political respon-
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sibility, accountability and transparency, under slogans such as “New Iceland”, in 
the open meetings and public rallies organized in Iceland (Óskarsdóttir 2013), and 
“They do not represent us”, “They call it democracy, but it is not that”, “It is not 
a crisis, it is the system”, and “Our model is the Icelandic one”, in Spain. Indeed, 
the Spanish and the Icelandic social movements differ from the mobilizations in 
other European countries. For instance, in France, Greece, or the United Kingdom, 
mobilizations were more focused on social expenditure restraints and no so much 
on a bad political management of the crisis (see Jiménez 2011). 
In Iceland, a minority government took office in 2009. New elections and the 
establishment of a constitutional assembly, figured among its promises. The in-
creased popularity of the Left-Green-Movement (founded in 1999) gave an his-
toric victory to the two left-of-centre parties, becoming to form a coalition alone 
(Óskarsdóttir 2013). Left-Green supporters constituted the most numerous group 
among the demonstrators and though new ad hoc groups organized the protests, 
some of them had links to the Left-Green-Movement (Óskarsdóttir 2012). In Spain, 
the 15-M movement did not established formally ties with any political party, but 
favoured the foundation of new parties, informally linked to the movement, as 
was the case of the We Can party, officially founded two months before the Eu-
ropean elections held on May 20, 2014. The We Can party was able to obtain 
1,253,837 votes (representing 5 MPs over a total of 54). Within a framework tra-
ditionally marked by bipartisanship, the two biggest parties obtained 7,712,571 
votes versus 12,812,016 ballots in the previous elections, held in 2009 (30/54 
MPs versus 44/50 MPs), with the We Can party in fourth place, after the “Left 
Pluralism” Coalition (see table 7). These electoral outcomes reveal change aspira-
tions of the Spanish population. As was the case in Iceland, the unpopularity of 
the government does not translate into a gain for the opposition (Óskarsdóttir 
2012). The electoral outcomes in Spain illustrate that the existence of just a single 
electoral constituency without threshold (for allocating seats purpose, in contrast 
to the general and local elections in Spain) favours the presence of minor and/or 
new parties in the parliament, even though D´Hondt method applies in all cases. 
In respect of the We Can party voters, 45% of them has 35-54 years of age; 21% 
has university studies, and half of them works. In the previous European elections, 
34% of them voted the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, 17% the United Left, and 
5% the People´s Party (Toharia 2014). These figures indicate that the grosso of 
the voters is clearly situated at left-of-the-center.
With respect to the main differences between the 15-M movement and “the 
pots and pan revolution” and their effects, in Iceland “... soon the demands be-
came more specific. They included a call for new elections, the replacement of the 
leadership of the Central Bank and general reforms that would lead to a better po-
litical culture and improved political practices” (Óskarsdóttir 2012). Nevertheless, 
in Spain the formal political issues (such as the electoral reform) or those of general 
character (for instance, corruption, banks´ performance and media) were of more 
interest than specific policies (Calvo et al. 2011). With exceptional character, facing 
the regional and municipal elections (22 May, 2011), the participants recommend-
ed either not to vote, or to vote minor parties. Finally, aside from the differences 
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with respect to movement demands, the participants profile (age, laboral status 
and educative level, fundamentally) differs as well. In contrast to Spain, the Icelan-
dic movement was initiated by general population, and politicians played a lead-
ership role, while in Spain they were conspicuous by their absence (Postill 2014).
table 7.  eScapinG from the “bipartiSanShip model” (bipartidismo) in Spain: a compariSon of the 
eUropean electionS oUtcomeS in 2009 verSUS 2014 
Candidatures with MEPs 
and number
Elections June 7, 
2009
(50 MEPs)
Candidatures with 
MEPs and number
Elections May 25, 2014
(54 MEPs)
Votes MEPs Votes MEPs
People´s Party (PP) 6,670,232 23 People´s Party (PP) 4,098,339 16
 Spanish Socialist Wor-
kers’ Party (PSOE)
6,141,784 21
Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party 
(PSOE)
3,614,232 14
Coalition for Europe (CEU) 808,246 2
Coalition “Left 
Pluralism”
1,575,308 6
IU-ICV-EUiA-BA: The Left 588,248 2
We Can (Pode-
mos)a
1,253,837 5
Union, Progress and 
Democracy (UPyD)
451,866 1
Union, Progress 
and Democracy 
(UPyD)
1,022,232 4
Europe of the People: The 
Greens (Edp-V)
394,938 1
Coalition for Euro-
pe (CEU)
851,971 3
Left for the Right to 
Decide (EPDD)
630,072 2
Citizens-Party of 
the Citizenry (C´s)b
497,146 2
The People Decide 
(LPD)
326,464 1
European Springc 302,266 1
a New party, officially founded on March 11, 2014, and informally attached to the 15-M Movement 
by many citizens. 
b Created in 2006, originally centered in Catalonia as a non nationalistic left of centre party. Its 
activity includes at present the whole Spanish territory, presenting its candidature for the first time 
to the European elections.
c  A coalition of old parties, except EQUO, an ecologist party, created in 2011.
Sources: Boletín Oficial del Estado number 152, June 24, 2009 and Boletín Oficial del Estado 
number 142, June 12, 2014. 
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3.3. other practiceS and propoSalS of direct democracy both in iceland 
and in Spain
The PAM was created in 2009 with the aim of stopping the processes of 
eviction. This is one of the associations with which the 15-M movement usu-
ally collaborates. With respect to the eviction processes, it should be pointed 
out that in Spain repossessions by banks do not necessarily imply that the 
debt is fully repaid. The PAM together with other organizations have launched 
a “popular legislative initiative” (PLI) in order to secure that the devolution of 
the property is enough to cancel the debt. To process a PLI in Spain 500,000 
signatures are required (half of that required at EU level, for European Citi-
zens´ Initiatives), provided that the Bureau of Congress had previously given 
permission to collect them, among other many strict requirements. It should 
be pointed out that, even if all requirements are fulfilled, PLI in Spain have no 
binding character. Although almost 1,5 million signatures have been gathered 
in relation to the aforementioned PLI, the tortuous process and vicissitudes 
that this initiative has been suffering the last years is a good example of the 
obstacles that the politicians may add to an already per se nearly inaccessible 
formula in Spain.
On January 10, 2014, the Marches of Dignity (Marchas de la Dignidad) 
were publicly presented in Spain. They consist of numerous social and syndi-
calist collectives, among them, the PAM. They demand that the public debt 
should not be paid,  and they protest against the restraints of public services 
and elimination of some social rights (related to employment and housing is-
sues). Coming from different parts of Spain, the first big march converged in 
Madrid on March 22, 2014. This movement is particularly critical with the 
reform of the article 135 of the Spanish constitution approved in September 
2011 by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party with the support of the People´s 
Party and the Navarrese People Union, a regionalist party. The reform aimed 
at giving absolute priority to the payment of the public debt, as well as the 
interests. Though according to the Spanish constitution a referendum could 
have been convoked, the constitutional reform was carried out with virtually 
no parliamentary and social debate. Besides, the shift was done urgently, in re-
sponse to the fact that the EU had demanded member states to regulate these 
fiscal issues, though not necessarily through the carta magna. The Marches of 
Dignity demand the establishment of a constituent process.  
On the other hand, Better Reykjavik is a platform launched several days 
before the municipal elections held in 2010, without links with political parties. 
It aims to channel and prioritize citizens´preferences in the public domain. It 
is a good example of direct democracy supported by the new communication 
technologies, followed soon by a nation-wide platform; Better Iceland. 
Another illustrative and recent example of direct democracy in Iceland 
is related to the constitutional arrangement establishing that all legislation 
passed by the parliament must be signed by the president of the republic and 
how, in case of refusal, a referendum is to be held in order to decide in the 
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matter. Twice Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson refused to sign the Icesave agreements 
supported by the parliament. The first one derived from a petition formallized 
by around 25% of the electorate. A referendum was held in March 2010, with 
93% of voters rejecting the deal. The second referendum took place in 2011 
in relation to a new agreement rejected by 60% of voters. Finally, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands addressed the case to the European Free Trade 
Area court. Following the interpretation of the correspondig EU-directive, in 
January 2013, the court ruled the no obligation to compensate them. Howev-
er, Iceland had already paid a part of the deposit guarantees. Indeed, “Billions 
of krónur were pumped into the wrecked banking system, although the popular 
myth developed abroad was that the Icelanders had simply let the banks fall” 
(Jóhannesson 2013). All in all, with respect to the role of the presidency, coun-
terweighting the parliamentary majority might be interpreted as a reflection of 
citizenship´s support for more direct democracy (Óskarsdóttir 2013).
Finally, with respect to the constitutional reform in Iceland, it should be em-
phasized that the bill was actually kidnapped by the parliament in spite of hav-
ing been brought to a national referendum and supported by two-thirds of the 
electorate (Gylfason 2014b). This situation took place even after the numerous 
obstacles that the constituent process suffered from the very beginning, such 
as the minimal time granted to carry out a task of such a magnitude, particu-
larly, given the lack of expertise among the citizens elected for this purpose 
(Óskarsdóttir 2013 and Gylfason 2013b). Many of the potential implications 
of the changes included in the bill focused on the abolition of privileges. These 
implications, rather than the alleged technical issues, may well explain the lim-
ited parliamentary support that it finally received. For instance, one of them 
has to do with a new electoral system that eliminates the over-representation 
of rural areas in parliament (article 39). Also, a reduction of the role of political 
parties, in general, is foreseen in the constitutional bill. Other important inno-
vations concern different formulae of direct democracy, such as referenda or 
submissions of proposals to parliament at the initiative of voters (articles 65 
to 67), the appointment of civil servants (article 96), and the independence of 
the state agencies (article 97). In a nutshell, the bill represents a real trial of 
strength for the citizens representatives. 
It should be highlighted the trascendental role played by the new informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICTs) in relation to the (generally) well-
organized and coordinated protest movements and platforms, launched both 
in Iceland and Spain. In the Spanish case, the plurality of collectives involved in 
the 15-M movement shares an organizational model based on the reliability of 
ICTs in general and social networks in particular (Fuster 2012). In general, the 
distrust in representative democracy has been channeled to more direct citizen 
involvement through these tecnologies, given rise to a “... fundamental change 
in how individuals can interact with their democracy and experience their role 
as citizens...”. In this sense, we can assert that the “Internet democratizes” (Ben-
kler 2006). According to Castells (2005), democracy of communication equals 
direct democracy, so the fear to lose both information and communication 
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control explains the ambiguity of governments regarding the uses of the new 
ICTs.
4. diScUSSion
In this paragraph, on the one hand, the plausability of some of the vari-
ables associated to small-states literature in explaining the main differences 
found out between the Icelandic and Spanish cases is explored. On the other, 
diverse hypotheses from the political science literature are taken into account 
in order to explain the main parallelism found out between them, that is, the 
rising citizen involvement. 
Four variables are traditionally used to define the states size: population 
(states with less than 20 million inhabitants are considered small), territory, 
GDP or economic capacity, and military capacity. In the early days of small-
states literature from the 1960s, in close relation to the processes of decolo-
nization, another two concepts attracted particular attention: vulnerability and 
action capacity (Thorhallsson 2006). An important question to be considered 
refers to what extent size helps to explain the alleged uniqueness of the Icelan-
dic case with respect to the management of the economic and financial crisis. 
Three of the aforementioned aspects are to be taken into account: population, 
GDP and action capacity.
First, it might be argued that the small size of the Icelandic population, as 
well as its concentration around the Reykjavik metropolitan area, could well 
facilitate the organization, speediness, coordination and cohesion of the popu-
lar protests. Likewise, the absolute number of citizens required to attain the 
necessary percentage to claim for a referendum in Iceland is low, in compari-
son (where appropriate) with other countries. Moreover, it could be expected 
that, in a country where “everybody knows each other”, some corrupt prac-
tices must be more unlikely, given the social pressure. Even so, the literature 
concludes that from smallness one can expect mixed outcomes. Among the 
democracy-undermining effects the following practices may be mentioned: cli-
entelism, nepotism, and patronage (see, for instance, Srebrnik 2004, Corbett 
2015, Veenendaal 2015, and Veenendaal and Corbett 2015), concluding that 
“ ... there is little if any reason to believe that smallness directly enhances the 
democratic nature of microstates, which means that any explanation of for-
mally democratic institutions in microstates should be based on other factors 
than size” (Veenendaal 2015).
Second, another distinctive feature of the country concerning its size refers 
to the relative dimension of the financial imbalance, too big in relation to the 
size of its economy. Indeed, with independence of the Icelandic population 
revealing via referenda its opposition to paying for the damage done by the 
banking system to foreign depositors, the banks were too big to be saved. The 
size of the financial system was nine times the Icelandic GDP (Althingi 2010b), 
and the loss of the banks represented the equivalent of seven times Iceland´s 
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pre-crash GDP, a world record of debt hole in relation to the size of the econo-
my (Gylfason 2013a). 
Third, with respect to the ability to formulate and implement policies (i.e., 
action capacity), the smallness of Iceland in terms of bureaucracy capability (in 
close relation to institutions and civil servant expertise) should become even a 
greater problem if regulatory and supervision capacities are contemplated as 
well, insofar as these have been assessed, at best, as lax and week, respectively. 
Likewise, the fact that corruption in Spain concerns mainly subnational levels 
of government (for example, the capture of the cajas by politicians) might be 
related to the smaller size of peripheral administrations in comparison with the 
central state administration. In this sense, there would be more parallelisms 
with the Icelandic case than it seems at first glance. However, in the Spanish 
case, the real problem seems to be rather the institutional design of  adminis-
trations, which favours certain practices of local corruption linked to urban de-
velopment (Fundación Alternativas, 2012). For instance, at municipal level, the 
concentration of political power and the small size of many municipalities have 
favoured the creation of clientele networks (Fundación Alternativas, 2012). In 
addition, several legal reforms that have been taking place in the last decades, 
supposedly with the aim of  modernizing local administrations, have lead in 
fact to the weakening of institutional controls (Fundación Alternativas, 2007).  
It should also be taken into account the fact that the notion of a state size 
and its action capacity may well be influenced by the views of political elites 
and other relevant actors, such as pressure groups and firms (Thorhallsson 
2006). In this sense, in Iceland, references to the vikings´ epic achievements, 
in nationalistic discourses made during the period immediately previous to the 
economic and financial crisis, may have contributed to overvalue both the size 
and the capacities of the Icelandic economy. Moreover, Thorhallsson (nd) high-
lights that although the small size of the Icelandic public administration and its 
particular vulnerability to powerful pressure groups limited “... Iceland´s ability 
to deal with the massive financial sector, the political situation and political 
culture played a part as well”, in line with the main conclusion of the WGE (see 
Althingi 2010a and Árnason 2010).
Despite the Spanish population size, a cohesive social movement of pro-
tests without precedents took place in 2011; the 15-M movement. Certain-
ly, the new ICTs and the expertise of the “freedom technologists” helped to 
overcome possible obstacles in the organization and coordination of different 
events, counterbalancing to a great extent the inconveniences that the size 
of the Spanish population could represent. Indeed, the flow and diffusion of 
information have taken place to a great extent through digital means (Calvo 
et al. 2011). These tools have also provided a considerable support to other 
initiatives, such as the Marches of Dignity or the rising trend towards signing 
petitions. 
In sum, among the variables associated to small-states literature, it is esti-
mated that two of them are susceptible to explain the special features of the 
Icelandic case: the GDP and the action capacity, particularly the first one. The 
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relevant issue facing the crisis was the widened gap between them. Let us call 
this plausible explanation the “mirage hypothesis”. 
The main parallelism found out beetween the Spanish and the Icelandic 
cases was a significative shift towards more citizen involvement and more di-
rect democracy. In political science, two competing explanations are managed 
in order to explain more direct citizen involvement in political processes: the 
new politics and the political dissatisfaction hypotheses. The first one refers to 
the new democratic values that inspire citizens in the advanced democracies, 
together with the availability of better political resources -such as skills-, giving 
rise to a new participatory style and also questioning the hierarchical authority 
structures. As more citizens feel qualified to take political decisions themselves 
without requiring the intervention of political parties or political elites, they 
become more politically engaged. This approach is also labelled as the political 
competence hypothesis. The second hypothesis relates to a growing dissatis-
faction with the current system of representative democracy and a downfall 
of both voter turnout and public trust in parties and representative institu-
tions, giving rise to claims for changes in the political system, as well as more 
political engagement (Dalton et al. 2001 and Bowler et al. 2007). Thus, this 
explanation is also known as the distrusting citizen hypothesis. The concept of 
“stealth democracy” has been more recently incorporated to the discussion 
of “dissatisfied democrats”. It defines a preference for a non visible and silent 
democratic procedure in a routine basis, guided by unselfish and more compe-
tent politicians; but if politicians´ decisions are much too influenced by special 
interests, support for direct democracy, instead of less citizen involvement, 
migth result as a second best option. As far as surveys usually do not provide 
enough options to express this preference, the support for direct democracy (a 
single usual measurement) might be veiling other preferred means to improve 
the way democracy works (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009).
From the scarce empirical literature on the subject it is not possible to 
obtain definitive conclusions with respect to the factors explaining the public 
support for direct democracy. Taking the evidence from a survey of the Ger-
man public, Dalton et al. (2001) concluded that the political dissatisfaction 
hypothesis obtained more support, and similar patterns were found out in Eu-
rope as a whole. In the German case, the support of direct democracy was not 
dependent on age, attracting more support from those at the politics margins: 
the least interesed in politics, the less educated, and the adherents of protest-
minor parties. In Bengtsson and Mattila (2009), the political dissatisfaction 
hypothesis was supported by the opinion of the Finnish electorate. Another in-
teresting finding concerns the similarities found among the factors contributing 
to the probability of being supporters of either “stealth democracy” or more 
direct democracy, even if  right-wing citizens are more interested in “stealth 
democracy” and left-wing citizens in direct democracy. Different results, gen-
erally speaking, were obtained by Donovan and Karp (2006), and Bowler et 
al. (2007). The first one is focused on the use of the referenda and popular 
initiatives in six countries (Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
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and Switzerland), with support of public opinion surveys. Mixed results were 
derived from various models estimated with logistic regression. Though the 
authors find some support for the political competence hypothesis (outside 
the Nordic countries), the results must be interpreted with caution, given that 
the fit of the models was rather poor. In his turn, Bowler et al. (2007) carried 
out separated estimates of approval of referendum use and factors afecting 
expectations for more opportunities for citizen participation, in 16 European 
countries and in the United States of America (USA). Even if both issues were 
closely linked, very succinctly, they found some evidence that approval of di-
rect democracy came from people politically engaged, rather than from those 
politically disaffected. Instead, political distrust resulted as one of the most 
consistent factors predicting interest in additional opportunities to participate. 
We have found just one study referred specifically to the “stealth democ-
racy” in Spain (Font et al. 2012). They have found a quite high support for tech-
nocracy (more than in the USA and Finland), as well as huge claims for more 
participative spaces (greater than in other western countries). Thus, in Spain, 
as in other countries, institutional distrust is related to alternative formulae of 
government, both “stealth democracy” and more citizen involvement in politics 
(see, for instance, Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009). The support for more partici-
pative formulae responds to the youngest, more educated, and ideologically 
either left-of-the-center, or minor parties adherents. Instead, “stealth democ-
racy” predominates among non educated people and right-wing voters. 
In spite of the fact that the study here presented has not been designed 
to discern the most plausible hypothesis/es to explain the political attitudes 
of the Icelanders and of the Spaniards before the economic crisis, the analysis 
carried out allows us, to some extent, suggest the most plausible ones. We 
proceed to do it this way with the aim of suggesting possible future lines of 
research and, of course, with all the prudence that the complexity of the phe-
nomenon studied requires. 
With respect to the most relevant political citizen initiatives that have re-
cently taken place in Spain, our findings provide some support for the the new 
politics or the political competence hypothesis in order to explain the 15-M 
movement. This is so because of the low age of the participants, as well as their 
high educative level and intensive use of new ICTs, except for the fact that when 
they vote, they do it for minor parties. All these traits correspond exactly to 
those associated by Font et al. (2012) to the supporters for more participative 
formulae in Spain. All in all, generational issues may be interfering here, as well 
as other underlying variables, suggesting particular caution with regards to the 
interpretation of the subject under discussion. In relation to the so-called “We 
Can phenomenon”, the explanation is still more fuzzy: among its supporters 
predominated median age people, with high educative level, and not placed at 
the margins, neither in general nor in politics terms, given that more than one 
third had voted for one of the biggest (out-of-the-left) parties in Spain in the 
previous European elections. Finally, both phenomena, the 15-M movement 
and the “We Can phenomenon”, have to do with citizens placed mostly in the 
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left-of the-center, and in this sense, this is coherent with the results obtained 
by Bengtsson and Mattila (2009) for Finland. 
With respect to “the pots and pans revolution”, with support on the par-
ticipants profile previosuly described (about age and links to minor parties, 
included the Left-Green Movement), is not clear which of the hypotheses fits 
better, though the distrusting citizen hypothesis could hold pretty well .
Political culture, especially “the extractive elites”, played a key role in the 
evolution of the economic and financial crisis, as well as with respect to the 
ability to deal with it, both in Iceland and Spain. For the moment, the crisis has 
given rise to two common relevant outcomes in both countries: a rise of the 
political and institutional disaffection and, at the same time, numerous initia-
tives of protest, highlighting the “the pots and pans revolution” and the 15-M 
movement, respectively. The citizens anger and discontent has not necessarily 
led to apathy. Rather, disaffection has led to other forms of participation, away 
from most of the political institutions more consolidated. All in all, direct de-
mocracy in strict sense has rooted more in Iceland than in Spain, where, for in-
stance, referenda have been held on rare occasions. Citizen-initiated referenda 
are not foreseen in the Spanish law, neither have been promoted in an indirect 
way. With respect to the PLI, another relevant formula of direct democracy, it 
should be remarked that, in Spain, in addition to the hard obstacles they have 
to overcome, they lack binding character. This is the consequence of delaying 
some relevant political reforms due to the “culture of the transition”, in close 
relation to a democracy considered “too young”. At first sight, citizen attitudes 
in Iceland and Spain seem to be similar. They share several common tools to 
channel political demands; in particular, the most accessible means of citizen 
participation: town meetings and rallies. The main difference between these 
two countries is by far the institutional gap in terms of some means of direct 
democracy to attain their aspirations, such as referenda, PLI, and the possibil-
ity of counterbalancing parliamentary power, virtually absent in the Spanish 
political arena. In conclusion, it’s not just the size that matters, but rather the 
institutions.
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